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The Sovereign Debt Dilemma 
When it becomes necessary for a state to declare itself bankrupt, in 
the same manner as when it becomes necessary for an individual to 
do so, a fair, open, and avowed bankruptcy is always the measure 




Over the past two decades, the securitization of 
sovereign lending and the emergence of the secondary debt 
market have transformed the contours of the global financial 
system.2 Although public debt remains one of the most effective 
tools to implement domestic economic policy,3 fundamental 
changes in the design and structure of sovereign financing 
have stymied the efficient restructuring of state obligations.4 In 
particular, the late-1980s shift from syndicated bank lending5 
to securitized bond financing6 has resulted in a vast 
  
 1 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH 
OF NATIONS 468 (Edwin Cannan ed., The Univ. of Chi. Press 1976) (1776). 
 2 Michael Wolfgang Waibel, Sovereign Debt Restructuring 6 (Winter 2003) 
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://forschungsnewsletter.univie.ac.at/ 
fileadmin/user_upload/int_beziehungen/Internetpubl/waibel.pdf.). 
 3 For example, public debt can fund human capital development and 
physical infrastructure projects, mitigate the effects of temporary economic downturns, 
and redistribute “resources from future generations to the current one.” EDUARDO 
BORENSZTEIN ET AL., AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, LIVING WITH DEBT: HOW TO 
LIMIT THE RISKS OF SOVEREIGN FINANCE 3-4 (2006). 
 4 A. Mechele Dickerson, A Politically Viable Approach to Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 997, 1012 (2004). 
 5 Under the syndicated lending practices of the 1970s, relatively small 
groups of commercial banks would extend credit to a sovereign “on identical terms . . . 
pursuant to a single loan agreement.” Lee C. Buchheit & Ralph Reisner, The Effect of 
the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Process on Inter-Creditor Relationships, 1988 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 493, 500 (1988). From the perspective of the debtor, syndicated lending 
facilitates the acquisition of funds, which would otherwise be unattainable from an 
individual financing source. Likewise, for both lenders and borrowers, syndicate loans 
promote efficiency by aggregating initial negotiations and subsequent loan 
administration into a single, collaborative endeavor. Id.  
 6 In response to the fallout from the Latin American debt crisis of the early-
1980s, United States Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady sought “to ‘securitize’ 
sovereign loans by converting loan obligations into bonds.” Philip J. Power, Sovereign 
Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market and Its Implications for Future Restructurings, 
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diversification of sovereign creditors and a substantial increase 
in the collective action problems among them.7 This change, 
combined with the lack of reliable enforcement regimes and 
restructuring institutions, has led to a global sovereign debt 
dilemma.8 
In conjunction with the return of securitized bond 
financing,9 the global debt crisis of the 1980s also spurred the 
emergence of a secondary market in sovereign debt.10 To policy 
makers and sovereign debtors alike, this new market presented 
a host of challenges that were not present under previous 
financing schemes.11 Accordingly, when subsequent financial 
crises necessitated the renegotiation of sovereign obligations, 
the syndicate loan restructuring model12 no longer functioned in 
  
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2701, 2720 (1996). Under the so-called “Brady Plan,” syndicate 
bank loans were pooled together and exchanged for debt-securities guaranteed by 
United States Treasury Bills. Jessica W. Miller, Comment, Solving the Latin American 
Sovereign Debt Crisis, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 677, 685-86 (2001). After repackaging, 
the securities were sold in the public markets and the sale proceeds used to satisfy 
outstanding sovereign loan obligations. Power, supra, at 2720. As a result of 
securitization, individual bondholders replaced commercial bank syndicates. Id. at 
2719. Although sovereign lending has evolved to include other types of bond 
instruments, the securitization of debt remains the principle means of sovereign 
financing today. Christopher C. Wheeler & Amir Attaran, Declawing the Vulture 
Funds: Rehabilitation of a Comity Defense in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 39 STAN. J. 
INT’L L. 253, 261 (2003). 
 7 William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best 
Interest of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1, 20-22 (2004). 
 8 Dickerson, supra note 4, at 1012-13. 
 9 Following the independence movement of the early nineteenth century, 
newly sovereign nations in Latin America began to procure external financing through 
government bond issues in European capital markets. BORENSZTEIN ET AL., supra note 
3, at 63. After enjoying almost a century of heavy capital inflows, World War I brought 
most sovereign financing to a halt. Id. at 63, 75-76. With the onset of World War II and 
the resulting European capital controls, the United States replaced Britain as the 
center of global capital. Id. at 76. By the time the credit markets thawed in the 1970s, 
New York had emerged as the dominant capital market and syndicated lending had 
replaced bond financing as the primary mode of sovereign borrowing. Id. at 74, 79. 
 10 See infra Part II. 
 11 See infra Part II.B. 
 12 Between 1982 and 1983, over fifteen countries declared that they would 
fall into arrears or suspend payments on approximately $90 billion in foreign syndicate 
loans. Power, supra note 6, at 2708 n.27. Due to the relatively small number of lenders 
and the interconnected nature of the affected notes, principles of “shared sacrifice” 
dominated the syndicate loan restructuring atmosphere. Id. at 2710. Accordingly, bank 
advisory committees were formed to promote “equity among banks, . . . and . . . [make] 
it harder for individual banks to hold out for special treatment.” Charles Lipson, 
Bankers’ Dilemmas: Private Cooperation in Rescheduling in Sovereign Debts, WORLD 
POLITICS, Vol. 38, No. 1 200, 212 (Oct. 1985). In accordance with these equity 
principles, lenders were asked to extend gap financing to sovereign debtors equal to 
their pro rata share of credit exposure. Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or 
Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L. J. 
1043, 1058 (2004). As a temporary stopgap measure, bridge financing permitted a 
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the fluid and dynamic secondary market.13 Initially, the 
international debate centered on whether public institutions or 
private actors should lead the call to restructuring reform.14 
However, with the death of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism,15 independent, contractual remedies continue to 
govern sovereign debt restructuring and will do so for at least 
the foreseeable future.16 
In 2002, soon after Argentina declared a $132 billion 
public debt default,17 significant contractual reforms began to 
permeate throughout the sovereign financing market.18 At first, 
Mexico took center stage when it announced the first large-
scale sovereign bond issuance in New York to incorporate 
collective action clauses (the “CACs”).19 By providing for the 
supermajority modification of certain repayment matters, 
CACs sought to curb the inefficiencies posed by the unanimous 
  
debtor to make interest payments while creditors worked to reschedule the principal 
due on the loan. Power, supra note 6, at 2709-10. Likewise, due to the discretionary 
enforcement nature of the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, which 
required lenders to accumulate additional reserves, federal banking regulators were 
not above making “‘friendly’ calls” to incentivize uncooperative lenders to participate in 
the restructuring process. Id. at 2713. In addition, cross-default clauses in the 
syndicate loan agreements discouraged maverick litigation by requiring all legal 
proceeds to be shared pro rata with fellow lenders. Anne Krueger, First Deputy 
Managing Director, International Monetary Fund, Speech at the Economics Society 
Dinner, The Evolution of Emerging Market Capital Flows: Why We Need to Look 
Again at Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Jan. 21, 2002), available at 
http://imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002/012102.htm. 
 13 See infra Part II.B. 
 14 See generally LUCIO SIMPSON, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE 
AND DEVELOPMENT, G-24 DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, THE ROLE OF THE IMF IN DEBT 
RESTRUCTURINGS: LENDING INTO ARREARS, MORAL HAZARD, AND SUSTAINABILITY 
CONCERNS, 1-9 (2006). 
 15 Under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund, the SDRM was 
based on Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code and sought to ensure the 
“orderly . . . and rapid restructuring of . . . debt, while protecting asset values and 
creditors’ rights.” Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign 
Debt, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 299, 337-40 (2005); ANNE O. KRUEGER, INT’L MONETARY FUND, 
A NEW APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 4, 21 (2002).  
 16 See infra Part I.A. 
 17 Clifford Krauss, Argentine Leader Declares Default on Billions in Debt, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2001, at A1. 
 18 See infra Part III. 
 19 United Mexican States, Prospectus, at 7 (Dec. 4, 2002). Prior to Mexico’s 
2003 issuance, unanimous action clauses (the “UACs”) governed the vast majority of 
sovereign bonds issued pursuant to New York law. Under a UAC, the modification of 
reserved matters cannot be effectuated without unanimous bondholder consent. As a 
result, small factions of holdout creditors can derail the restructuring process. Sergio J. 
Galvis & Angel L. Saad, Collective Action Clauses: Recent Progress and Challenges 
Ahead, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 713, 714-15 (2004). Because CACs impair the ability of a 
holdout creditor to derail debt rescheduling, they are generally regarded as a more 
efficient means to facilitate sovereign debt restructuring. 
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action clauses, which had previously dominated the market.20 
Several months later, Uruguay followed with a similar debt 
issuance that incorporated CACs along with aggregation 
principles and a pseudo-trustee structure.21 In the event of a 
debt restructuring, aggregation enables a supermajority of 
bondholders to cram down the modification of certain reserved 
matters across multiple series of bonds.22 Likewise, the weak 
trustee structure underlying the notes provided bondholders 
with a centralized figure that could both initiate collective legal 
actions as well as distribute any resulting legal award.23  
Although these contractual reforms pushed sovereign 
financing forward, none provided a comprehensive solution to 
the creditor holdouts that pose the sovereign debt dilemma.24 
Under collective action theory, rational, self-interested 
individuals will choose personal gain over the pursuit of 
collective objectives.25 As a result, some form of coercion is 
required to obtain the optimal aggregate outcome.26 In the case 
of a sovereign debt default, the potential recoveries from 
holdout-litigation motivate creditors to abstain from the 
voluntary restructuring process.27 Without an indenture trustee 
to strip bondholders of their right to pursue individual legal 
remedies,28 the Mexican and the Uruguayan reforms have failed 
to fully embrace effective contractual coercion.29 Given this 
inability to efficiently coerce creditor cooperation, the holdout 
problem will persist, and the sovereign debt dilemma will 
remain. 
Part I of this Note begins with a brief examination of 
the primary differences between lending in the public and 
  
 20 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1093. 
 21 República Oriental del Uruguay, Trust Indenture Filed April 10, 2004, 13-
15, 35-36 [hereinafter República Oriental, Indenture]; see also Galvis & Saad, supra 
note 19, at 717. 
 22 Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 722. 
 23 República Oriental, Indenture, supra note 21, at 14; Galvis & Saad, supra 
note 19, at 723-24.  
 24 See infra Part IV. 
 25 Indeed, “even if all of the individuals in a large group are rational and self-
interested, and would gain if, as a group, they acted to achieve their common interest 
or objective, they will still not voluntarily act to achieve that common or group 
interest.” MANCUR OLSON, JR, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND 
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 2 (1965). 
 26 Id.  
 27 Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 6, at 259-60. 
 28 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1105; see also Galvis & Saad, supra note 
19, at 723. 
 29 See infra Part IV. 
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private spheres, as well as a cursory review of the current state 
of sovereign debt. Part II explores the collective action 
challenges that resulted from the rise of the secondary debt 
market and the inability of public institutions to effectively 
resolve this problem. Part III contends that the Mexican and 
the Uruguayan models fail to adequately combat the 
complexities of the holdout problem. To better address this 
issue, as well as provide for greater efficiency in debt 
restructuring, Part IV advocates for the inclusion of an 
indenture trustee clause in subsequent sovereign financing 
contracts. 
I. BACKGROUND OF THE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS  
A. Differences Between Sovereign and Private Lending 
To fully appreciate the role of holdout creditors and the 
resulting sovereign debt dilemma, it is first necessary to 
understand the fundamental differences between public and 
private borrowing.30 In the context of private lending, creditors 
have recourse to legal regimes that will enforce the payment 
obligations of debtors.31 Similarly, bankruptcy institutions 
protect distressed borrowers from financial dismemberment32 
and ensure “equal treatment” among similarly situated 
creditors.33 As a result, private financing schemes provide both 
  
 30 Bratton & Gulati, supra note 7, at 10-12.  
 31 Id. at 11. In the sphere of private lending, the maxim pacta sunt servanda 
continues to apply. Henry T. C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the 
Corporate Duty to Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1389-90 (2007). Accordingly, if a 
debtor fails to comport with his or her promise to pay, courts will enforce this 
obligation in accordance with debtor-creditor and contract law. Id.; see, e.g., Gerdes v. 
Kennamer, 155 S.W.3d. 541, 546 (Tex. App. 2004) (holding that a court may order a 
judgment debtor to turnover property “subject to the debtor’s control” even though the 
property is located outside of the United States) (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 
ANN. § 31.002(b)(1) (Vernon 1997)). 
 32 For example, the automatic stay provision of the United States Bankruptcy 
Code “provides the debtor with relief from the pressure and harassment of creditors 
seeking to collect on their claims” as well as “breathing space . . . to focus on its 
rehabilitation or reorganization.” 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 362.03 (2005); 11 
U.S.C.A. § 362 (2006). 
 33 Rory Macmillan, Towards a Sovereign Debt Work-Out System, 16 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 57, 74 (1995). The equitable distribution of assets among similarly 
situated creditors is a core principle of the United States Bankruptcy Code. 5 COLLIER 
ON BANKRUPTCY § 541.01 (2007). Accordingly, U.S. bankruptcy courts “should aim to 
treat similarly situated creditors similarly.” Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 477 
(2004).  
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debtors and creditors with access to legal authorities that will 
enforce the reasonable expectations of the lending agreement.34 
In the world of sovereign financing, however, things are 
different,35 since creditors lack recourse to reliable enforcement 
institutions when the borrower fails to pay.36 In the United 
States, prior to the passage of the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (the “FSIA”), sovereign debtors enjoyed an 
unqualified immunity in both state and federal courts.37 With a 
judiciary that recognized absolute sovereign immunity, lenders 
relied solely on the President to compel payment from 
recalcitrant sovereign debtors.38 Today, though the United 
States Supreme Court has held that debt obligations are a 
“commercial activity” no longer subject to sovereign immunity,39 
  
 34 Mitu Gulati & George Triantis, Contracts Without Law: Sovereign Versus 
Corporate Debt, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 977, 986 (2007). “The assurance of protection from 
the consequences of debtor default is a fundamental necessity in the commercial world, 
whose order depends upon the predictability of the debtor-creditor relationship and the 
realization of reasonable expectations.” E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Recent Developments in 
Commercial Law, 11 RUTGERS-CAM. L.J. 527, 657 (1980). 
 35 Bratton & Gulati, supra note 7, at 11.  
 36 Id. In addition to the lack of enforcement mechanisms, secured lending is 
usually not an option when contracting with a sovereign. Patrick Bolton & David A. 
Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should a Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be 
Structured?, 53 EMORY L. J. 763, 793 (2004). 
 37 Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 1573, 1618 (2007). When the United States Supreme Court first examined 
sovereign immunity in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, the Court found “that the 
sovereign power of the nation is alone competent to avenge wrongs committed by a 
sovereign, that the questions to which such wrongs give birth are rather questions of 
policy than of law, [and] that they are for diplomatic, rather than legal discussion.” The 
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146 (1812). 
 38 Clark, supra note 37, at 1618. 
[E]arly Presidents embraced the role of chief negotiator by espousing and 
settling claims of U.S. citizens against foreign nations barred by foreign 
sovereign immunity. Presidents would decide, in their discretion, whether 
and how to espouse such claims. Even if the President agreed to espouse a 
claim, he retained wide-ranging discretion in disposing of it. He could 
“compromise it, seek to enforce it, or waive it entirely.” . . . In the end, 
whatever compensation the President secured for the claimant was almost 
certainly greater than any amount the claimant could recover on his or her 
own, since foreign sovereign immunity foreclosed access to U.S. courts.  
Id. at 1627-29. Outside the United States, one of the most infamous attempts at 
sovereign debt collection occurred in 1902, when the British and German navies fired 
on the Venezuelan coast and threatened to invade unless the debts of their subjects 
were paid in full. Likewise, it was not until 1907 that Luis Drago, the Argentine 
politician, first espoused the doctrine that sovereign debt cannot justify an armed 
conflict or occupation of a debtor state. See Lee C. Buchheit, The Role of the Official 
Sector in Sovereign Debt Workouts, 6 CHI. J INT’L L. 333, 336-37 (2005). 
 39 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 620 (1992). 
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lenders continue to face daunting debt collection challenges.40 
For example, because FSIA does not permit a creditor to seize 
sovereign assets located outside of the U.S. border,41 sovereign 
debtors have transferred assets out of the United States on the 
eve of declaring default.42 Once these monies have exited the 
country, the lender often remains without an effective means to 
collect on the sovereign debt.43  
When compared to commercial borrowing, sovereign 
lending also carries a heightened expectation of breach.44 While 
economic or political factors may give rise to a sovereign’s 
default, the absence of realistic enforcement procedures 
provides an incentive for nation-states to ignore debt 
obligations even when they are able to pay.45 Rather than face 
the political, economic, or social consequences of conservative 
fiscal policies, sovereigns may choose instead to default 
opportunistically.46 As a result, a common assumption 
underlying the sovereign financing process is that the borrower 
will inevitably fail to pay.47 Consequently, a primary challenge 
for sovereign lenders is to devise a contractual mechanism that 
will realize the reasonable expectations of the lender-borrower 
relationship when the debtor inevitably defaults.48 
In addition to the lack of effective enforcement 
mechanisms, there is similarly no global institution to address 
  
 40 Bratton & Gulati, supra note 7, at 11. For instance, two problems that 
continue to plague sovereign debt satisfaction are: (1) the difficulty in identifying 
sovereign property that is subject to execution, and (2) the inability to liquidate a 
sovereign debtor. Id.  
 41 Jonathan C. Lippert, Vulture Funds: The Reason Why Congolese Debt May 
Force a Revision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 21 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 14-15 
(2008). Indeed, the scope of FSIA extends only to “property in the United States.” 28 
U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2008). 
 42 In fear of creditor enforcement actions, Argentina removed assets from the 
United States and deposited them in the Bank for International Settlements before 
declaring a default in 2001. Bratton & Gulati, supra note 7, at 35. 
 43 In the majority of cases, the sovereign’s courts cannot seize the sovereign’s 
assets. Hal S. Scott, A Bankruptcy Procedure for Sovereign Debtors?, 37 INT’L LAW 103, 
116-17 (2003). 
 44 Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition in 
the Shadow of the International Order, 53 EMORY L.J. 692, 694 (2004). In addition, the 
transaction costs of dealing in sovereign debt are higher than the costs of similar 
corporate transactions. Gulati & Triantis, supra note 34, at 986. 
 45 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1048-49. 
 46 Id. Professors Fisch and Gentile argue that holdout litigation serves an 
important role in frustrating the desirability of an opportunistic default. Id. at 1047. 
Although this may well be the case, it remains to be seen whether such benefits are 
outweighed by the restructuring disruptions that such creditors pose. 
 47 Id. at 1044. 
 48 Id. at 1090. 
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the problem of sovereign debt restructuring.49 Whereas legal 
tribunals can allocate the financial rights of debtors and 
creditors in bankruptcy, sovereigns are not subject to domestic 
insolvency proceedings.50 Although both academics and 
multinational institutions have put forth proposals for the 
creation of a global sovereign insolvency regime,51 these efforts 
have failed to garner sufficient support for their 
implementation.52 Most recently, Anne Krueger of the 
International Monetary Fund (the “IMF”) called for the 
formation of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (the 
“SDRM”).53 However, due to pushback from both debtor and 
creditor states, the SDRM was placed indefinitely on hold.54 
With the rise of contractual approaches to sovereign debt 
restructuring, the current prospects for a global sovereign 
insolvency regime appear to be nil.55 As a result, lenders and 
borrowers are left to develop their own contractual devices to 
effectuate the efficient restructuring of sovereign obligations. 
B. History of Modern Sovereign Financing 
The roots of the holdout problem in sovereign debt 
restructuring can be traced to the years spanning the early 
1970s to the early 1980s, when lending to sovereign debtors 
experienced exponential growth.56 During this period, syndicate 
loans57 from commercial banks in the United States and 
  
 49 Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 714. Although creditors and debtors can 
currently enter into informal agreements under the supervision of the IMF through 
Paris Club (sovereign creditors and sovereign debtors) and London Club (sovereign 
debtors and private creditors) negotiations, this system is noncompulsory and has been 
criticized for its inefficiency. Dickerson, supra note 4, at 1008-12. 
 50  See generally, Caroline Atkinson, Forget Sovereign Bankruptcy Plans 
(2002), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=4584. 
 51 KRUEGER, supra note 15, at 4.  
 52 Dickerson, supra note 4, at 998. 
 53 KRUEGER, supra note 15, at 21. 
 54 Adam Brenneman, Comment, Gone Broke: Sovereign Debt, Personal 
Bankruptcy, and a Comprehensive Contractual Solution, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 649, 679 
(2006). 
 55 Id.  
 56  For example, in the ten year period between 1973 and 1983, foreign debt in 
Latin America increased by more than 700%. Miller, supra note 6, at 680 (quoting Roy 
MacMillan, The Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31 STAN. J. INT’L L. 395, 311 n.31 (1995) 
(citing PEDRO-PABLO KUCZYNSKI, LATIN AMERICAN DEBT 14 (1988))). 
 57 “A syndicated loan is one that is provided by a group of lenders and is 
structured, arranged, and administered by one or several commercial or investment 
banks known as arrangers.” STANDARD & POOR’S, A GUIDE TO THE LOAN MARKET 7 
(2009), available at https://www.lcdcomps.com/d/pdf/LoanMarketguide.pdf.  
2010] THE SOVEREIGN DEBT DILEMMA 913 
Western Europe functioned as the dominant source of financing 
for sovereigns in the developing world.58 After the 1979 energy 
crisis,59 however, the Federal Reserve Board (the “Fed”) 
increased interest rates to combat growing domestic inflation, 
and as a result capital flew from developing countries back into 
the United States.60 In response to the Fed’s higher discount 
rate, lenders in the United States hiked prime rates on 
outstanding sovereign loans.61 To the sovereigns, this had the 
detrimental effect of increasing both the nominal value of 
interest payments as well as the real rate of interest on their 
debt.62 Consequently, on August 22, 1982, Mexico became the 
first nation of the 1980s financial crisis to announce that it 
would be unable to service its outstanding loan obligations.63 
Less than one year later, fifteen additional countries declared 
  
 58 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1054; see also Power, supra note 6, at 
2707. During this period, U.S. financial institutions were awash in deposits from oil-
exporting nations, Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1054, while an economic 
downturn and rising inflation at home reduced the domestic demand for credit. Power, 
supra note 6, at 2707. Given the surplus of petrodollar deposits and the rising price of 
raw material exports from developing nations, commercial banks viewed sovereigns as 
a justifiable credit risk. Id. Indeed, lenders believed “sovereign borrowers were immune 
from bankruptcy risk and would not suspend debt servicing.” Alberto Gonzalo Santos, 
Beyond Baker and Brady: Deeper Debt Reduction for Latin American Sovereign 
Debtors, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 66, 74 (1991). As a result, financial institutions would 
routinely ignore sound lending practices such as profitability analysis and investment 
requirements. Id. at 73-74. To sovereign debtors, rising inflation in the United States 
counteracted high interest rates, id. at 72, and also rendered the real rate of interest 
negative for a few years, increasing the desirability of borrowing in U.S. dollars. Id. at 
72 n.41. Encouraged by the liberal lending practices of U.S. banks combined with 
highly favorable financing costs, many countries pursued unsustainable development 
through excessive foreign borrowing at the expense of conservative fiscal policies. Id. at 
74-75.  
 59 The overthrow of the Shah of Iran resulted in an energy crisis that doubled 
the price of oil within a year. Jon H. Sylvester, Impracticability, Mutual Mistake, and 
Related Contractual Bases for Equitably Adjusting the External Debt of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 13 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 258, 264 (1992). Although some debtor nations are 
petroleum producers (e.g., Venezuela), the vast majority are not. Id. at 264 n.30. 
Accordingly, to compensate for the increased cost of petroleum products, sovereign 
debtors borrowed more heavily from commercial banks. Power, supra note 6, at 2707-
08. At the same time, however, global recession precipitated a reduction in gross 
returns on the commodity exports that nations used to service their debt. Id. at 2708. 
 60 Santos, supra note 58, at 74-75. 
 61 Edward Cowan, Bank Lending Rate Set at Record 14% by Federal Reserve, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1981, at A1. 
 62 Power, supra note 6, at 2708. 
 63 Lee C. Buchheit, A Quarter of a Century of Sovereign Debt Management: 
An Overview, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 637, 637 (2004). Although earlier in 1982 Argentina 
suspended payment on $37 billion in foreign debt after its defeat in the Falkland 
Islands War, “it was the Mexican default that shook the financial world.” RICHARD 
JOLLY ET AL., UN CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEVELOPMENT THINKING AND PRACTICE 142 
(2004). 
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that they too would fall into arrears or suspend payments on 
approximately $90 billion in foreign debt.64  
At the time of the crisis, many commercial banks had 
extended loans to sovereign debtors in amounts that greatly 
exceeded their capacity to lend.65 To avoid having to declare 
significant balance sheet losses, commercial banks jointly 
extended bridge loans to sovereign debtors, which permitted 
them to make interest payments while creditors worked to 
reschedule the principal due on the loans.66 Although creditors 
with larger exposure to the debt crisis were more willing to 
provide funds to engage in gap financing measures,67 peer and 
regulatory pressures ensured cooperation even among the 
smallest and most recalcitrant lenders.68 In addition to 
austerity programs,69 the IMF also instituted policies 
conditioning new loans on the ability of a nation to obtain 
  
 64 Power, supra note 6, at 2709 n.28; see also Steven M. Cohen, Note, Give Me 
Equity or Give Me Debt: Avoiding a Latin American Debt Revolution, 10 U. PA. J. INT’L 
BUS. L. 89, 97 (1988).  
 65 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1057. For example, in the United States, 
nine of the nation’s largest financial institutions had loaned more than 250% of their 
aggregate capital to sovereign nations. Id. Under United States banking regulations, 
lenders had to declare a loan as non-performing if interest on the note was over 90-
days past due. Id. If the sovereign debtors defaulted on their loans, lenders would have 
almost certainly faced bankruptcy. Id.  
 66 Power, supra note 6, at 2709-10. Under this approach, if banks were 
continuing to receive interest payments in a timely fashion, they could continue to 
carry the sovereign notes as assets on their balance sheets and avoid bankruptcy. Id. at 
2710; Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1057. 
 67 Creditors with heavy exposure to the crisis were more willing to provide 
gap financing for two principal reasons. First, like other creditors, bridge loans would 
ensure that they could maintain sovereign loans as an asset on their balance sheets. 
Since these creditors were more heavily exposed to the crises in the region, their 
prospects for bankruptcy were more acute than those of minor participants. Similarly, 
these large lenders wanted to maintain good working relationships with the 
sovereigns. In many cases, the banks looked forward to developing new relationships 
with local businesses and opening up retail banks in the sovereign nations. See Fisch & 
Gentile, supra note 12, at 1058-60. 
 68 Free-riding creditors were a potential problem if larger banks provided the 
entire financing necessary to avoid default. Id. at 1060. Under this scenario, sovereign 
debtors would have sufficient funds to make interest payments on all their outstanding 
notes. Consequently, less-exposed creditors would receive the benefit of timely interest 
payments without having to incur the costs and additional exposure required by 
providing gap financing. To secure full compliance, members of bank advisory 
committees were assigned to oversee smaller banks within their geographical region. 
Id. at 1060-61. Because smaller banks sought to grow and develop their working 
relationships with other financial institutions, larger lenders would threaten 
international and domestic market isolation if the smaller banks failed to participate in 
the restructuring of sovereign debt. Id. at 1061. 
 69 Such “programs usually involve[d] cutting public spending, devaluing the 
national currency to stimulate exports and reducing imports.” Burton Bollag, U.N. 
Critical of I.M.F. Austerity Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1989, at D7. 
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additional financing from all of its current lenders.70 Because of 
these collective pressures, between 1982 and 1984 commercial 
banks successfully restructured over forty loan agreements 
with more than thirty different countries.71 While the 
comparatively homogenous views of syndicate bank lenders 
reduced creditor coordination problems and facilitated the 
efficient rescheduling of sovereign debt, the subsequent rise of 
bond financing in the mid-1980s presented new collective 
action challenges that threatened to hinder the successful 
restructuring of sovereign obligations.72 
II. THE EMERGENCE OF A SECONDARY MARKET IN 
SOVEREIGN DEBT 
A. Beginnings of a Secondary Market: Inter-Bank Swaps 
and Brady Bonds 
Although the extension of bridge loans by bank advisory 
committees and multilateral institutions73 helped to 
temporarily stave off losses from debtor nations,74 several years 
of cyclical restructuring fatigued creditors, and as a result 
many institutions opted out of the process.75 As the crisis 
continued to worsen, a secondary market in sovereign debt 
began to emerge.76 Initially, this market consisted entirely of 
inter-bank swaps,77 but as the sovereign debt crisis 
  
 70 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1061. 
 71 Id. at 1063. 
 72  Bratton & Gulati, supra note 7, at 20-21. 
 73 In 1985, at the World Bank Meeting in Seoul, South Korea, United States 
Secretary of the Treasury James A. Baker III proposed a plan whereby multinational 
institutions such as the IMF and World Bank would extend an additional $9 billion in 
loans to debtor states. Under the terms of the plan, borrowing nations would adopt 
austerity measures in exchange for the funds. To some observers, the differences 
between the Baker Plan and the private restructuring organized by bank advisory 
committees were minimal. Santos, supra note 58, at 76-77. 
 74 Id.  
 75 Development Committee, Joint Ministerial Committee of the Boards of 
Governors of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, A Strategy for 
Restoration of Growth in Middle-Income Countries That Face Debt-Servicing 
Difficulties 12-13 (1986), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/ 
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2001/02/15/000178830_98101901582392/Rendered/PDF/
multi_page.pdf. 
 76 Sylvester, supra note 59, at 272.  
 77 Power, supra note 6, at 2715. 
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deteriorated, banks began to trade their foreign loan assets for 
cash.78 
After several years of accumulating cash from sovereign 
loan exchanges, many banks had attained a level of loan-loss 
reserves that could sustain substantial write-off losses from 
sovereign notes.79 Soon thereafter, it became clear to lenders 
that the principal on sovereign loans would not be repaid at 
“any time in the foreseeable future.”80 To reduce the debt 
burden on commercial banks, United States Treasury 
Secretary Nicholas Brady announced a plan to “‘securitize’ 
sovereign debts by converting loan obligations into bonds.”81 
Under the Brady Plan, syndicated bank loans were pooled 
together and exchanged for Brady Bonds guaranteed by United 
States Treasury Bills.82 After repackaging, the bonds were sold 
in the public markets and the proceeds used to satisfy the 
sovereign’s outstanding debt.83 Importantly, this securitization 
  
 78 Even though it was highly unlikely that the sovereign debts would be ever 
be fully repaid, the secondary market became quite popular with some investors. Id. at 
2716. At first, this market was principally composed of large corporate investors 
seeking debt-for-equity swaps.  
In a debt-for-equity swap, an investor approaches a large debtor nation and 
expresses an interest in investing in an industry or specific business. The 
investor proposes to buy outstanding debt from a specific creditor or on the 
open market for a fraction of the face amount of the outstanding loan. The 
investor then sells the outstanding loan to the debtor nation for the face 
amount or for a discounted amount of local currency . . . . The investor then 
uses the sale proceeds to buy an equity stake in the local business, and makes 
further capital investment. 
Sylvester, supra note 59, at 272. But as lenders increasingly tried to exit from the 
unraveling sovereign debt market, they rapidly reduced the price of their sovereign 
loan assets. Rory Macmillan, supra note 56, at 328. Given the availability of fire sale 
prices, investors with no interest in equity swaps began to purchase the heavily 
discounted notes. Power, supra note 6, at 2718. Even if the debtor only paid back a 
fraction of the loan’s face value, an investor could realize a potentially large profit. 
Macmillan, supra note 33, at 328. Similarly, because interest continued to accrue on 
the face value of the notes, interest payments alone could yield “an above-market rate 
of return.” Power, supra note 6, at 2719. 
 79 Power, supra note 6, at 2719. 
 80 Miller, supra note 6 at 685. By 1989, “the pretense of keeping . . . [the] 
loans on the books at face value could not longer be maintained.” Macmillan, supra 
note 56, at 313. 
 81 Power, supra note 6, at 2720. Under the so-called “Brady Plan,” commercial 
banks agreed to partially forgive sovereign debt obligations “in exchange for both a 
commitment on the part of the debtors to adopt specified reforms designed to achieve 
sustainable growth . . . and greater assurances of the collectability of the debt.” Fisch & 
Gentile, supra note 12, at 1067. 
 82 Miller, supra note 6 at 685. 
 83 Power, supra note 6, at 2720. The securitization of sovereign lending was 
quite popular with the market. Accordingly, within five years of initiating the Brady 
Plan, “‘more than half of the affected debt stock had been traded in the hands of non-
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process replaced debts owed to commercial banks with 
obligations to a group of individual bondholders.84 As a result of 
the Brady Plan, sovereign financing “shifted” from the banking 
business to the securities markets85 and, although the 
techniques have changed,86 the securitization of debt remains 
the principle means of sovereign lending today.87  
B. The Emergence of the Holdout Problem 
Unlike the homogenized bank syndicates of the 1970s 
and 1980s, post-Brady bondholders are diverse.88 Whereas 
“[b]ank lenders are repeat players, constrained to cooperate 
with one another,”89 groups of bondholders constantly change as 
the securities are bought and sold in the market.90 Similarly, 
the vast majority of sovereign bondholders lack any 
relationship with the debtor, because they became creditors 
through secondary trading.91 In the absence of a rapport with 
either the sovereigns or with each other, bondholders do not 
feel the same pressures to “compromise their . . . claims” or 
share sacrifice.92 Instead of investing with a common purpose, 
the liquid secondary market aggregates investors93 with vastly 
divergent short-term and long-term goals.94 Given the relative 
anonymity among them,95 there is little collective pressure to 
cooperate.96 Consequently, sovereign bondholders pose a 
collective action problem whereby holdout creditors can derail a 
  
bank investors.’” Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 6, at 261 (quoting Lee C. Buchheit, 
Sovereign Debtors and Their Bondholders, in UNITAR TRAINING PROGRAMMES ON 
FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS: SOVEREIGN DEBTORS AND THEIR BONDHOLDERS 7).  
 84 Power, supra note 6, at 2719. For the syndicated bank lenders, 
securitization enabled them to escape from the sovereign debt market. Fisch & Gentile, 
supra note 12, at 1067. 
 85 Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 6, at 261. 
 86 In the past ten years, sovereign lending has moved from Brady Bonds to 
other types of bond instruments. See Miller, supra note 6, at 687. 
 87 Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 6, at 261. 
 88 Id.  
 89 Bratton & Gulati, supra note 7, at 20. 
 90 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1071. 
 91 Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 6, at 261. 
 92 Dickerson, supra note 4, at 1013. 
 93 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1071. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Ahdieh, supra note 44, at 704. 
 96 Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 6, at 261. 
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potentially successful restructuring.97 It is this tyranny of the 
minority that poses the sovereign debt dilemma. 
1. The Unanimous Action Requirement and the Vulture 
Fund Holdouts 
Currently, the United States dominates the market for 
sovereign bond issuances, and New York law governs the 
majority of U.S.-issued sovereign bonds.98 Until Mexico’s 
sovereign bond issuance in 2003, the vast majority of these 
bonds incorporated unanimous action clauses (the “UACs”).99 
Under a UAC, any alteration to a bond’s repayment terms 
cannot be effectuated without the unanimous consent of all 
bondholders.100 As a result, small factions of minority creditors 
can derail a widely approved restructuring by withholding 
their support.101  
Along with the disruptive power of minority 
bondholders, the creation of a secondary market in sovereign 
debt also brought about the rise of “[f]unds specializing in 
distressed assets.”102 Generally, these “vulture funds” purchase 
deeply discounted sovereign debt on the secondary market103 
and later attempt to collect on their claim in full.104 Although 
  
 97 Dickerson, supra note 4, at 1013. 
 98 Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 6, at 259. Historically, most sovereign 
financing activity took place in European capital markets. However, with the onset of 
World War I in 1914 and the subsequent global depression, sovereign lending shifted 
west. As the dominant capital market in the United States, New York emerged as the 
new leader in sovereign finance. By the time the credit markets thawed in the 1970s, 
New York had already established itself as the center of the sovereign financing 
establishment, a position it maintains to this day. BORENSZTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 
74-76. 
 99 Dickerson, supra note 4, at 1013-14. In part, the use of UACs in sovereign 
bonds can be traced to the United States’ implementation of the Trust Indenture Act of 
1939. Pursuant to the Act, corporate bonds issued in the United States were required 
to incorporate UACs. Although the Act did not apply to sovereign bonds, commentators 
have noted that the inclusion of UACs in sovereign financing contracts may simply be 
the result of “drafting momentum.” Buchheit & Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the 
Collective Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 1317, 1329-30 (2002). 
 100 Dickerson, supra note 4, at 1013-14. 
 101 Brenneman, supra note 54, at 680. 
 102 Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 6, at 254. 
 103 Id. As a business model, the vulture fund structure can reap significant 
rewards. In one case, Elliott Associates, a New York-based fund, earned over 494% on a 
single investment in Peruvian debt. See id. at 258. 
 104 Id. at 262. While champerty laws prevent a third party from purchasing a 
secondary debt with the sole intention of immediately litigating the claim to obtain full 
recovery, sovereigns have resoundingly failed in their attempt to combat vulture funds 
through champerty statutes. See James Thuo Gathii, The Sanctity of Sovereign Loan 
Contracts and Its Origins in Enforcement Litigation, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 251, 
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there is usually no reasonable expectation that the debt will be 
fully repaid,105 vulture funds “refuse to participate” in the 
restructuring process106 because they are immune to the “peer 
or regulatory” pressures that permeate syndicated bank 
lending.107 As a result, these funds circumvent traditional 
sovereign debt collection procedures and utilize litigation to 
obtain the full face value of their claims.108 
For a bond issued with UACs, the vulture fund 
litigation strategy poses substantial problems for the 
restructuring process.109 Since an amendment to repayment 
terms cannot take effect without all outstanding bondholders 
agreeing to the alteration, the sovereign debtor has incentives 
to make side payments to any recalcitrant creditors.110 In doing 
so, the sovereign debtor inadvertently encourages future 
holdouts.111 Not only does a holdout receive the benefit of a side 
payment, it may also continue to pursue legal remedies to 
recover on the full face value of its claim.112 If such litigation 
proves successful, it depletes the total funds available to satisfy 
the claims of other similarly-situated creditors.113 Thus, instead 
of promoting an orderly distribution of assets, the ability of a 
vulture fund to derail the restructuring process encourages the 
financial butchering of a sovereign’s foreign exchange 
reserves.114 “[A] single default” can activate cross-default 
clauses in other debt instruments and quickly flood the 
sovereign in an unexpected “avalanche of redeemed debt.”115 
Even if litigation proves to be unsuccessful, the unanimity 
requirements of a UAC provision allow a single holdout to 
  
311-12 (2006); see also Elliott Assocs. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 381 (2d Cir. 
1999) (holding that the New York champerty statute “is not violated when . . . the 
accused party’s ‘primary goal’ is . . . [the] satisfaction of a valid debt and its intent is 
only to sue absent full performance.”). 
 105 See generally Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1044. 
 106 Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 6, at 254, 263. 
 107 Id. at 262. 
 108 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1045. The litigation by some vulture 
funds has become increasingly aggressive. In the case of the Republic of Congo, vulture 
funds have attempted to collect on claims by attaching assets held by United States 
corporations doing business with the nation. See generally, Lippert, supra note 41. 
 109 See Dickerson, supra note 4, at 1013-15; Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, 
1045-46; Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 6, at 262-63. 
 110 Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 6, at 259-60. 
 111 Id.  
 112 Id.  
 113 Id.  
 114 Id. at 260-61 
 115 Id. at 260. 
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bring the entire restructuring process to a halt during the 
pendency of the suit.116 Although these holdouts may provide 
valuable benefits to the sovereign financing process,117 they can 
also thwart a potentially successful restructuring118 and impose 
heavy burdens on the citizenry of the debtor nation.119 
Consequently, holdout bondholders can obstruct the efficient 
restructuring of sovereign obligations and therefore create the 
sovereign debt dilemma.120 
2. Inability of Public Institutions to Solve the Sovereign 
Debt Crisis 
In 2002, to combat the efficiency costs of the holdout 
problem, Anne Krueger of the International Monetary Fund 
called for the creation of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism (the “SDRM”) under the auspices of the IMF.121 
Based on Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code,122 
the SDRM sought to ensure the “orderly . . . and rapid 
restructuring of . . . debt while protecting asset values and 
creditors’ rights.”123 However, the plan ran into problems as 
soon as it was announced. On the one hand, debtor-states 
criticized the SDRM for its infringement on national 
sovereignty and its potential to increase the cost of credit.124 On 
the other hand, lenders argued that a uniform means to 
restructure sovereign debt would reduce the number of 
potential investors.125 Most importantly, however, the United 
States disapproved of any global regime to effect sovereign debt 
  
 116 Dickerson, supra note 4, at 1013-14. 
 117 According to Professors Fisch and Gentile, “[h]oldout creditors . . . serve as 
a check on opportunistic defaults and onerous restructuring terms.” Moreover, the 
enforcement of debt obligations by the judiciary “enhances the operation of the 
sovereign debt market by lowering the cost of financing to sovereign debtors and 
increasing the value of the obligation to creditors.” Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 
1112. 
 118 Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 6, at 254. 
 119 Id.  
 120 Id. at 262 (quoting, G. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. Klee, Sovereign Piracy, 
56 BUS. LAW 635, 637-38 (2001)).  
 121 KRUEGER, supra note 15, at 1, 21. 
 122 Id. at 1, 4. 
 123 Id. at 1, 4. The SDRM was modeled closely on Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
proceedings in the United States. See id. at 21. 
 124 Brenneman, supra note 54, at 677-78. 
 125 Arturo C. Porzecanski, A Critique of Sovereign Bankruptcy Initiatives: The 
IMF and G7 Should Curb Financial Assistance to Countries in Trouble, BUS. ECON., 
Jan. 2003, at 39, 44. 
2010] THE SOVEREIGN DEBT DILEMMA 921 
restructuring.126 Accordingly, in April 2003, United States 
Treasury Secretary John W. Snow stated that it was “neither 
necessary nor feasible to continue working on the SDRM.”127 
Given the resistance of the United States and the investment 
community to any “statutory bankruptcy-like process,”128 the 
SDRM proposal was placed on hold.129 Today, any prospect for 
the establishment of a formal nation-state restructuring regime 
appears to be dead.130 
In the debate leading up to the demise of the SDRM, 
Treasury Secretary John W. Snow noted that “a contractual 
approach . . . would help promote a more orderly restructuring 
process . . . [because] [t]he source of . . . [the] problem . . . lies in 
the relationships and agreements . . . [between] debtors and 
their creditors.”131 Given the prevalence of UACs prior to 2003 
and the resulting holdout problem, the IMF,132 the United 
States,133 and the Group of 10 (the “G-10”),134 advocated for a full 
transition from unanimous action clauses to collective action 
clauses in sovereign financing contracts. Through the use of 
CACs, it was believed that the collective action problem could 
be mitigated, since a supermajority vote could bind a minority 
of holdout creditors.135 
  
 126 John W. Snow, U.S. Sec’y of Treas., Statement at the Meeting of the 
International Monetary and Financial Committee (Apr. 12, 2003), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/spring/2003/imfc/state/eng/usa.htm.  
 127 Id. 
 128 Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 715. Since adoption of the SDRM would 
require an amendment to the IMF charter, the proposal would have required the 
affirmative vote of U.S. representatives to the IMF. See Dickerson, supra note 4, at 
1017. 
 129 Ahdieh, supra note 44, at 708. 
 130 Brenneman, supra note 54, at 679. 
 131 Snow, supra note 126. 
 132 International Monetary and Financial Committee, International Monetary 
Fund, Communiqué, Dubai (Sept. 21, 2003) available at http://www.imf.org/external/ 
np/cm/2003/092103a.htm.  
 133 Ahdieh, supra note 44, at 708. 
 134 WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, GROUP OF TEN, REPORT OF 
THE G-10 WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES 3-6 (2002) [hereinafter WORKING 
GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/gten08.pdf. 
The “Group of 10” “refers to the group of countries that have agreed to participate in 
the [IMF’s] General Arrangements to Borrow, a supplementary borrowing 
arrangement that can be invoked if the IMF’s resources are estimated to be below 
member’s [sic] needs.” INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, FACT SHEET, A GUIDE TO 
COMMITTEES, GROUPS, AND CLUBS, 4 (2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/ 
np/exr/facts/pdf/groups.pdf. The members of the G-10 are: Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. Id. 
 135 BARRY EICHENGREEN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, CRISIS 
RESOLUTION: NEXT STEPS, 12-15 (2003).  
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III. THE MEXICAN AND URUGUAYAN MODELS  
A. The Mexican Model: Rise of the Collective Action 
Clause136 
In February 2003, Mexico became the first major issuer 
to incorporate collective action clauses (the  
“CACs”) into sovereign bonds governed by New York law.137 
Although other large capital markets had included CACs in 
sovereign bonds for quite some time, the New York markets 
had been hesitant to incorporate them.138 Unlike unanimous 
action clauses, CACs enable a sovereign to amend certain 
reserved matters139 on an outstanding bond by mere 
supermajority vote.140 Both academics and multinational 
  
 136 Although other nations had previously incorporated collective action 
clauses into their sovereign bond indentures, Mexico’s debt offering in 2003 was by far 
the largest and most visible. See generally Mark Gugiatti & Anthony Richards, The Use 
of Collective Action Clauses in New York Law Bonds of Sovereign Borrowers 6 (2004) 
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/international/ 
documents/gugiatti.pdf).  
 137 Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 715; see also United Mexican States, 
Prospectus, at 7 (Dec. 4, 2002). 
 138 These markets include London, Brussels, Luxemburg, and Tokyo. Hagan, 
supra note 15 at 317-18; see also Elmar B. Koch, Essay, Collective Action Clauses: The 
Way Forward, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 665, 667 (2004). In various forms, collective action 
clauses have been the norm under English law since the late 19th Century. Andrew G. 
Haldane et al. Optimal Collective Action Clause Thresholds 9 (2004) (unpublished 
manuscript, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/workingpapers/ 
wp249.pdf). However, in the United States, the Trustee Indenture Act of 1939 prohibits 
the use of CACs in corporate bonds. Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 316(b), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77ppp (2004); see also Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 
YALE L.J. 232, 250 (1987). Due in large part to market practice, the prohibition on 
CACs in the corporate context migrated to sovereign bonds. Bratton & Gulati, supra 
note 7, 55. In 2002, the G-10 Working Group on Contractual Clauses issued a report 
calling for the inclusion of CACs in future sovereign bond agreements. WORKING 
GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 134, at 3-4. In particular, the Working 
Group noted that the inclusion of CACs would diverge from market practice in both 
New York and Germany. Id.  
 139 In Mexico’s 2003 issuance, reserved matters included: “payment dates, 
payment amounts, interest rates, . . . payment currency . . . governing law, specified 
events of default, pari passu ranking, and submission to the jurisdiction of New York 
courts.” Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 715-16. 
 140 Id. at 715. Within the realm of collective clauses, there is much diversity. 
Although the general approval threshold was set by Mexico at 75%, some counties, 
such as Brazil, have required up to 85% approval. Likewise, though the majority of 
collective action clauses measure the voting base as the percentage of all outstanding 
bondholders, other nations have provided that the voting base will only consist of those 
holders who are present at a bondholder meeting. Similarly, other issues arise when 
the issuing nation or a state-owned entity is a holder of its own bonds. To combat the 
potential of undue influence in the approval process, most indentures have 
incorporated disenfranchisement clauses that prevent the state or entity from voting 
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institutions alike view CACs as “the most critical component” 
of curbing disruptive holdout litigation.141 Since a supermajority 
of bondholders can impose new repayment terms on 
recalcitrant holdout creditors,142 CACs are an effective restraint 
on the “tyranny of the minority” problem.143 To address the new 
risk of the majority abusing its bargaining power at the 
expense of minority bondholders,144 heightened approval 
thresholds may be utilized.145 Not surprisingly, CACs have been 
widely regarded as a necessary but potentially insufficient 
means to achieve the efficient restructuring of sovereign debt.146 
Pursuant to Mexico’s 2003 bond issuance, three-fourths 
of bondholders can ratify an amendment to certain reserved 
matters, such as repayment terms.147 To curb investor concerns 
that the English quorum approach148 would interfere with 
majority bondholder rights, the Mexican issuance provided for 
an approval threshold based on the total principal remaining 
on all outstanding bonds.149 In addition to CACs, Mexico also 
incorporated a disenfranchisement clause.150 As one of the 
  
on matters that require majority approval. Id. at 719-22; see also WORKING GROUP ON 
CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 131, at 1-6; Brenneman, supra note 54, at 681. 
 141 WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 134, at 3. 
 142 Brenneman, supra note 54, at 681; see also supra Part II. 
 143 Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 99, at 1325 (quoting FRANCIS B. PALMER, 
COMPANY PRECEDENTS 271 (2d ed. 1881)). 
 144 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1094-95. 
 145 The approval threshold represents the percentage of bondholders that 
must accept an amendment to the bond’s repayment terms. WORKING GROUP ON 
CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 134, at 4. In its contractual reform 
recommendations, the G-10 Working Group suggested that a 75% threshold would 
provide optimal benefits. Id. On the one hand, a higher threshold would increase the 
probability of holdout litigation. Id. On the other hand, too low a threshold may enable 
majority abuse of minority bondholders. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1094-95. 
Initially, investors in the United States were hesitant to accept this change out of a 
concern that the threshold represented the percentage of holders actually present at a 
bondholders’ meeting. WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 1384, at 
4. To address this concern, the G-10 recommended that the threshold percentage be 
based on the total principal remaining on all outstanding bonds. Id.  
 146 See generally, WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 
1384, at 3-7 (noting several recommendations to thwart holdouts in sovereign debt 
restructuring).  
 147 United Mexican States, Prospectus, at 7 (Dec. 4, 2002); Galvis & Saad, 
supra note 19, at 715. 
 148 WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 1384, at 4. Under 
the English quorum approach, the approval threshold is based on the percentage of 
bonds that are represented at the bondholders’ meeting, not the total number of bonds 
outstanding. Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 719. 
 149 United Mexican States, Prospectus, at 7 (Dec. 4, 2002).  
 150 Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 715. 
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recommendations made by the G-10,151 disenfranchisement 
clauses ensure that “[b]onds owned or controlled directly or 
indirectly, by the Issuer or by any public sector instrumentality 
of the Issuer . . . be disregarded and deemed not to be 
[o]utstanding.”152 To curb concerns over potential vote 
manipulation by the sovereign debtor,153 such provisions limit 
the ability of a sovereign to distort the outcome of a proposed 
debt restructuring by having bondholders vote against their 
interests and in favor of the sovereign’s dictates.154 Although 
Mexico limited the scope of its disenfranchisement clause,155 the 
2003 issuance did prohibit bonds “owned directly or indirectly 
by the [Mexican] federal government” from being counted in 
any subsequent vote.156 Within a year of Mexico’s drastic 
contractual reforms, both CACs and disenfranchisement 
clauses became standard market practice in New York.157 
  
 151 In 2002, the G-10 formed a Working Group on Contractual Clauses “to 
consider how sovereign debt contracts could be modified in order to make the resolution 
of debt crises more orderly.” WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 
1384, at 1. To that end, in September of 2002, the Working Group issued a Report with 
recommendations of contractual provisions to include in future sovereign financing 
agreements. Id. For the Working Group, the objectives to be achieved were: 
(i) to foster early dialogue, coordination, and communication among 
creditors and a sovereign caught up in a sovereign debt problem; 
(ii) to ensure that there are effective means for creditors and debtors to re-
contract, without a minority of debt-holders obstructing the process; and 
(iii) to ensure that disruptive legal action by individual creditors does not 
hamper a workout that is underway, while protecting the interest of the 
creditor group. 
Id.  
 152 Id. at 7. 
 153 Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 720. 
 154 WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 1384, at 4. 
 155 The wording of the Mexican disenfranchisement clause is somewhat 
narrower than that suggested by the G-10. Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 720. Under 
the G-10’s wording, bonds “owned or controlled” by the sovereign would be prohibited. 
WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 1384, at 17. Because Mexico 
limited its provision to bonds “owned” by the federal government, this might be viewed 
as more favorable to the sovereign debtor. Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 720. 
Although most other sovereigns have followed Mexico’s lead, Uruguay adopted the G-
10’s recommendation word-for-word. Id.  
 156 Id.  
 157 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, PROGRESS REPORT TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE ON CRISIS RESOLUTION 5 (Apr. 
20, 2004), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cr/2004/eng/042004.pdf. In 
less than a year after Mexico made its initial offering using CACs, over 11 countries, 
including Chile, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Peru, Poland, Turkey and Venezuela, 
incorporated CACs into their bonds governed by New York law. Id. at 3; see also Koch, 
supra note 138, at 673. Indeed, although “there were no sovereign bonds with CACs on 
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However, while the Mexican reforms were necessary, they were 
insufficient to achieve effective creditor cooperation in the 
absence of other coercive legal remedies.158 
B. The Uruguayan Model 
In March 2003, Uruguay became the second country to 
issue sovereign bonds incorporating CACs.159 Like the Mexican 
model, Uruguay provided for both a 75% approval threshold on 
reserved matters160 as well as an issuer disenfranchisement 
provision.161 In addition to the incorporation of reforms adopted 
from the Mexican model,162 the Uruguayan issuance also 
included aggregation principles163 and a weak-trustee 
structure.164 When compared to the Mexican reforms, the 
Uruguayan additions appear to provide a superior means to 
tackle several of the unresolved collective action problems.165 
However, though the Uruguayan issuance appears to better 
constrain the power of holdout creditors, it too fails to fully 
address the collective action crisis of sovereign debt 
restructuring.166  
  
the New York market in 2002, in 2003 nearly 50% . . . of all new sovereign bonds under 
New York law included CACs.” Id.  
 158 Robert B. Gray, Chairman, Int’l. Primary Mkt. Ass’n., Remarks at 
UNCTAD Fourth Inter-Regional Debt Management Conference (Nov. 11, 2003), 
available at http://www.efmagroup.net/getdoc/7514dd4b-4c34-4bc0-a266-f77648b5638a/ 
111103-RBG-UNCTAD-Speech-PDF.aspx. 
 159 República Oriental, Indenture, supra note 21, at 13-15; see also Galvis &. 
Saad, supra note 19, at 717. 
 160 República Oriental, Indenture, supra note 21, at 36. Under the Uruguayan 
issuance, reserved matters are very similar to those included under the Mexican model. 
See supra note 139 and accompanying text. In Uruguay’s 2003 issue, reserved matters 
include: payment dates, principal amounts, interest rates, currency, percentage of 
votes required for taking any action, pari passu rankings, governing law, and 
submission to New York courts’ jurisdiction. República Oriental, Indenture, supra note 
21, at 38. 
 161 Unlike the Mexican issuance, the Uruguayan disenfranchisement clause 
mirrored the G-10 recommendations exactly. Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 720; see 
also República Oriental, Indenture, supra note 21, at 25. 
 162 Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 717. 
 163 República Oriental, Indenture, supra note 21, at 36; see also Galvis & 
Saad, supra note 19, at 722-23. 
 164 República Oriental, Indenture, supra note 21, at 15; see also Galvis & 
Saad, supra note 19, at 724.  
 165 See infra Part III.B.1-2. 
 166 See infra Part IV. 
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1. Aggregation 
Under the Mexican model, voting provisions and 
approval thresholds apply individually to each bond series, and 
as a result, hinder the efficient restructuring of sovereign 
debt.167 In the absence of aggregation, an issuer must seek 
approval of a restructuring plan from the requisite percentage 
of holders in each individual bond series.168 Consequently, 
collective action problems arise both among bondholders within 
the same class, as well as among the various series of bonds.169 
As the number of series increases, or when different 
modification provisions govern several different series of bonds, 
this process becomes progressively complex.170 Similarly, the 
repeated renegotiation of identical terms across multiple bond 
series can prove to be incredibly inefficient to the sovereign 
debt restructuring process.171 Without aggregation, a group of 
rogue bondholders within a single series can hold up a 
potentially successful restructuring.172 In an effort to ameliorate 
these holdout creditors and move the restructuring process 
forward, a sovereign may “purchase” the consent of dissenting 
creditors through side payments, and inadvertently create a 
run on the sovereign debtor’s assets.173 Moreover, even 
  
 167 See Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 722-23. A single bond issuance may 
incorporate multiple series of bonds. For example, after the debt crisis of 2001, Argentina 
had to restructure 152 different bonds, issued in 14 different countries, denominated in 
seven different currencies, and subject to eight different governing laws. Dr. Guillermo 
Nielsen, Argentine Republic Sec’y of Finance, Speech at Dubai on Argentina’s Restructuring 
Guidelines (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://www.argentinedebtinfo.gov.ar/documentos/ 
discurso_gn_dubai_con_diap_english.pdf. 
 168 WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 1384, at 3. 
 169 Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 722. 
 170 David A. Skeel, Jr., Review Essay, Can Majority Voting Provisions Do It 
All?, 52 EMORY L. J. 417, 422-23 (2003). For example, an issuer could experience 
significant problems if one series of bonds is governed by CACs and another series has 
incorporated UACs.  
 171 Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, Is Aggregation a Problem for Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring? 1 (Jan. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, available at, 
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=801485); see also INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND, LEGAL DEPARTMENT, THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOVEREIGN DEBT—
ASSESSING THE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND FEASIBILITY OF AGGREGATING CLAIMS 8 (2003) 
(available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2003/090303.pdf). 
 172 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1094. The success of such a holdout 
strategy will ultimately depend on whether the bonds incorporate UACs or CACs. 
LEGAL DEPARTMENT, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, THE RESTRUCTURING OF 
SOVEREIGN DEBT—ASSESSING THE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND FEASIBILITY OF AGGREGATING 
CLAIMS 8 (2003). 
 173 Eichengreen & Mody, supra note 171, at 3. Under the United States 
Bankruptcy Code, private debtors and creditors can avoid this outcome because of the 
effect of the automatic stay (which halts attempts by creditors to collect on their debt 
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assuming that a change in repayment terms could be 
effectuated across multiple series of bonds, the size of a single 
holdout’s stake may be large enough to make the entire 
restructuring meaningless.174  
To address these efficiency issues and conform to the 
contractual recommendations of the G-10,175 Uruguay became 
the first sovereign to incorporate aggregation principles that 
provide for the cram down modification of reserved matters 
across multiple series of bonds.176 Under this provision, an 
amendment to repayment terms can be imposed against 
multiple bond series.177 Specifically, cram down can occur if the 
proponents of the modification obtain the support of “[h]olders 
of not less than 85% in aggregate principal amount of the 
Outstanding Debt Securities of all Series affected by that 
Modification (taken in aggregate) . . . and [h]olders of not less 
than 66-2/3% in aggregate principal amount of the Outstanding 
Debt Securities of that Series (taken individually).”178 When 
combined with Uruguay’s 75% approval threshold CAC,179 
aggregation allows the issuer to impose repayment term 
amendments on a one-third-minority holdout.180  
Most importantly, the incorporation of an aggregation 
clause encourages the type of collaboration and shared sacrifice 
that was commonplace during the era of syndicated bank 
lending.181 Because of cram down, aggregation permits the 
  
during the pendency of the case) and avoidable preference provisions (which void 
transactions that were made on the eve of filing the bankruptcy petition). 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 362, 547 (2005). 
 174 For example, if the holdout was the cause of the sovereign’s financial crisis.  
 175 Although the G-10 Working Group did “not [focus] on the technicalities of 
[aggregation provisions] in any detail,” their 2002 report did note that such clauses 
have “a great deal of potential” and “[merit] further exploration.” WORKING GROUP ON 
CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 138, at 6. 
 176 Alinna Arora & Rodrigo Olivares Caminal, Rethinking the Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Approach, 9 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 629, 663-64 (2003). 
 177 Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 722.; see also WORKING GROUP ON 
CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 1384, at 6-7. 
 178 República Oriental, Indenture, supra note 21, at, 36; see also Galvis & 
Saad, supra note 19, at 722. 
 179 Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 723. 
 180 By providing for aggregation, the Uruguayan model “effectively reduces” 
the approval threshold “from 75% to two-thirds.” Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 723. 
For example, under CAC with a 75% approval threshold, a minority faction of one-third 
of outstanding bondholders in a single series can block any amendment to reserved 
matters for that series. With aggregation, however such holdouts have less power. If 
the proponents of a reserved matter modification can obtain the approval of 85% of the 
aggregate principle of all outstanding series, the amendment can be crammed down on 
a single series with no more than one-third holdouts. 
 181 See supra Part I.B. 
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issuer to focus on areas of collective agreement across multiple 
bond series.182 Similarly, the threat of cram down encourages 
the holders of different bonds to work together to arrive at a 
settlement that is jointly advantageous.183 With the presence of 
a highly liquid secondary market, moreover, recalcitrant 
bondholders remain free to avoid what they may deem as 
inequitable concessions by selling their bonds in the open 
market.184 As a result, the Uruguay model promotes and fosters 
collaboration among creditors while providing an avenue for 
those who wish to opt out of the process.185 
2. Fiscal Agency and Trust Structures 
While collective action clauses make the restructuring of 
sovereign debt somewhat easier, they only solve a portion of 
the holdout problem.186 Under both UACs and CACs, sovereign 
bonds issued pursuant to New York law generally incorporate a 
fiscal agency structure.187 Under this approach, each bondholder 
retains an individual right to seek legal remedies against the 
sovereign debtor in the event of default.188 Although direct legal 
actions were at one time quite rare,189 litigation to collect 
against sovereign debtors is increasing.190 In the absence of 
“sharing clauses,”191 litigating creditors under both the Mexican 
and the Uruguayan models do not have to divide legal awards 
  
 182 Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 722. 
 183 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1090-95.  
 184 Id.  
 185 Id.  
 186 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1093-95; see also Skeel, supra note 170, 
at 423-24. 
 187 Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 723; see also WORKING GROUP ON 
CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 138, at 6. Although sovereign bonds issued in 
England have incorporated trust deeds for quite some time, sovereign bonds in the 
United States typically utilize a fiscal agent. WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL 
CLAUSES, supra note 1384, at 6; Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1102. 
 188 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, PROGRESS REPORT TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE ON CRISIS RESOLUTION 10 n.16 
(Apr. 20, 2004) [hereinafter IMF, PROGRESS REPORT], available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cr/2004/eng/042004.pdf. 
 189 Bratton & Gulati, supra note 7, at 34. 
 190 IMF, PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 188, at 13. 
 191 For example, in the event that a court awards a litigating bondholder a 
“disproportionate” judgment, a sharing clause may require that bondholder to turn 
over any overpayment to the fiscal agent for a pro rata distribution to other 
bondholders. Although such clauses were common during the era of syndicated bank 
lending, they are rarely found in sovereign bond financing. Lee C. Buchheit, Changing 
Bond Documentation: The Sharing Clause, 17 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 17, 17-18 (1998). 
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pro rata with fellow bondholders.192 Because sovereign debt 
restructuring qualifies as a “zero sum game,”193 litigation 
becomes “infectious”194 as creditors race to seize a defaulting 
sovereign’s assets.195 Accordingly, though the introduction of 
CACs and aggregation principles begin to address the holdout 
problem, civil suits by dissenting bondholders continue to 
reduce both the net pool of assets available to other creditors as 
well as the potential for a successful restructuring of the 
sovereign’s outstanding debt.196  
Under the Mexican model, the fiscal agent is a relatively 
weak entity that controls merely the distribution of payments 
and simple forms of interaction between the issuer and the 
bondholders.197 As an agent of the sovereign debtor, the fiscal 
agent does not represent the interests of the bondholder class.198 
Pursuant to most Fiscal Agency Agreements,199 the fiscal agent 
“acts solely . . . for the issuer and does not have any fiduciary 
relationship to the bondholders.”200 As a result, the fiscal agent 
has very limited bondholder duties.201 In most cases, these 
obligations are confined to: giving notice of specified events, 
assembling a bondholder meeting if petitioned by the requisite 
percentage of bondholders, and appointing a chairperson at the 
bondholder meeting.202 Given that the fiscal agent has no power 
to file suit against the sovereign debtor,203 and that the creditors 
retain an individual right to litigate on their claims,204 the fiscal 
agency structure is ineffective in preventing disruptive 
litigation on the part of holdout creditors.205 
  
 192 Brenneman, supra note 54, at 680. 
 193 Buchheit, supra note 191, at 18. In other words, the sovereign’s assets that 
are available to satisfy bondholder debt are limited. Therefore, as one creditor collects 
on its claim, another creditor is left with fewer assets to satisfy its claim.  
 194 Id.  
 195 Id.  
 196 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1093-95 . 
 197 Macmillan, supra note 33, at 65-66. 
 198 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1102 . 
 199 The Fiscal Agency Agreement is the controlling document that governs the 
sovereign debtor and fiscal agent relationship. Macmillan, supra note 56, at 341. 
 200 Id. at 341-42. 
 201 Id. at 341. 
 202 Id.  
 203 See also Working Group on Contractual Clauses, Group of Ten, Report of 
the G-10 Working Group on Contractual Clauses (2002), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/gten08.pdf.  
 204 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1102. 
 205 Id. at 1103. 
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To avoid some of the collective action and efficiency 
problems inherent in multiple civil suits,206 the Uruguayan 
model incorporates a weakened trustee structure instead of the 
fiscal agency model.207 Although the trustee structure does not 
preclude individual bondholders from filing suit to recover 
outstanding amounts payable,208 the trustee does have the 
power to initiate legal action on behalf of the bondholder 
class.209 Accordingly, in the event of a default, the trustee is an 
“identifiable leader” to coordinate collective bondholder 
action.210 Similarly, when engaged in litigation, the trustee acts 
for the benefit of the entire bondholder class and distributes 
any resulting award pro rata.211 In accordance with G-10 
recommendations,212 the trustee is also responsible for 
gathering and distributing financial information concerning 
the sovereign debtor in the event of a debt restructuring.213 Yet, 
while the Uruguayan trustee structure plays a more prominent 
role in addressing the holdout problem, the model fails to 
  
 206 See supra Part II.B. 
 207 República Oriental, Indenture, supra note 21, at 17;, see also Part IV. 
Uruguay was the first nation to utilize an Indenture Trustee in a New York sovereign 
financing agreement. Galvis &. Saad, supra note 19, at 724. In addition, by 
incorporating a weak trustee structure, the success of Uruguay’s issuance also 
demonstrated a market willingness to move away from the traditional fiscal agency 
model. 
 208 In particular, if the Republic fails to make payments when due, individual 
bondholders can sue to recover. República Oriental, Indenture, supra note 21, at 15; see 
also Arora & Caminal, supra note 176, at 663; Galvis &. Saad, supra note 19, at 724. 
 209 The trustee can initiate such action on the request of 25% of outstanding 
bondholders. República Oriental, Indenture, supra note 21, at 15. Pursuant to the 
indenture, “the Trustee, in its own name . . . shall be entitled and empowered to 
institute any action or proceedings at law or in equity for the collection of . . sums . . . 
due and unpaid.” Id. at 13. Some academics suggest that the primary benefits of a 
trustee could be achieved without shifting from the fiscal agent structure. By 
“concentrat[ing] ‘the right to sue’ in a single representative of bondholders” the same 
benefits could be obtained. Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 723-25. 
 210 Macmillan, supra note 56, at 341. 
 211 Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 722-24. 
 212 WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 1384, at 3. 
 213 Such information includes: 
(i) a description of the economic or financial circumstances that . . . explain 
the request for the proposed Modification;  
(ii) if the Republic . . . [has] entered into a standby, extended funds, or 
similar program with the International Monetary Fund . . . ; and 
(iii) a description of the Republic’s proposed treatment of its other major 
creditor groups . . . . 
República Oriental, Indenture, supra note 21, at 37; see also, Galvis & Saad, supra note 
19, at 722; Anna Gelpern, How Collective Action is Changing Sovereign Debt, 22 INT’L 
FINANCIAL L. REV., 19 (2003).  
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prevent rogue litigation,214 and as a result, collective action 
problems remain.  
IV.  THE SUPER TRUSTEE SOLUTION 
In 2002, when the G-10 reported on contractual 
solutions to the sovereign debt crisis, it recommended both the 
inclusion of CACs215 and the incorporation of a “super” trustee 
structure.216 Under the “super” trustee model, bondholders 
generally do not have the right to bring legal actions in their 
individual capacity.217 Rather, the authority to file suit against 
the sovereign debtor usually lies solely with an indenture 
trustee.218 As a result, litigation can only be brought on the 
trustee’s own initiative or upon the direction of a specified 
percentage of outstanding bondholders.219 Similar to the 
Uruguay model, if any resulting legal action proves successful, 
the trustee, as representative of the entire bondholder class, 
must share any award pro rata.220 
For the better part of the last century, the Trust 
Indenture Act of 1939 (the “Act”) has mandated a trust 
indenture structure for public corporate bonds.221 Under the 
Act, the trustee is an agent of the bondholders and owes to 
them a duty of good faith.222 Although the trustee’s duties are 
limited outside of the default scenario,223 the trustee does 
ensure compliance with the terms of the indenture even when 
the debtor is paying as required.224 If a debtor defaults, 
  
 214 Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 723-24. Although the Uruguayan Trustee 
curbs holdout litigation on accelerated amounts (those payments not yet due), it fails to 
effectively control individual legal actions for past amounts due. Id. at 724 n.23. 
 215 WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 1384, at 3. 
 216 Other recommendations included: revised provisions for calling bondholder 
meetings; majority enforcement of acceleration clauses; provisions requiring 
appropriate information to be disseminated to bondholders; and disenfranchisement 
provisions from the issuer of the bonds. See id. at 2-7. 
 217 IMF, PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 157, at 10 n.16. 
 218 WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 1384, at 6-7. 
 219 IMF, PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 157, at 10 n.16. 
 220 WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 1384, at 6-7. 
 221 Yakov Amihud, Kenneth Garbade, & Marcel Kahan, A New Governance 
Structure For Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. L. REV. 447, 485 (1999). In addition, the Trust 
Indenture Act of 1939 explicitly exempts governments, both domestic and foreign, from 
its requirements. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77ddd(a)(6) (1998); see also Macmillan, supra note 56, 
at 339-41. 
 222 Macmillan, supra note 586, at 339-41.  
 223 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1105. 
 224 Macmillan, supra note 586, at 339-40. 
932 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:3 
however, the trustee’s duties become much more complex.225 In 
accordance with the Act, the debtor’s default triggers the 
trustee’s fiduciary duties to the bondholder class.226 In addition, 
the trustee is the only entity that is able to accelerate principal 
amounts due on outstanding bonds.227 Unlike a fiscal agent, the 
trustee acts as a fiduciary for bondholders, and thus only the 
trustee may file suit against the debtor.228 Unless the trustee 
fails to comport with its fiduciary obligations, bondholders are 
limited in the types of lawsuits they can bring.229 Consequently, 
the Act both limits the ability of holdouts to pursue obstructive 
litigation tactics and provides bondholders with a centralized 
fiduciary to enforce the payment obligations of recalcitrant 
corporate debtors.230 
Although the Uruguayan model provides for an 
indenture trustee with some control over the sovereign debt 
restructuring process, it fails to solve the holdout dilemma, 
because rogue creditors can continue to file adversary actions.231 
By incorporating CACs and aggregation principles but failing 
to preclude suits by individual bondholders,232 the model fails to 
live up to its full potential.233 Under a “super” trustee approach 
akin to that required by the Trust Indenture Act, the holdout 
problem could be greatly curbed.234 Whereas CACs and 
aggregation clauses in the Uruguay model prevent holdout 
creditors from halting the restructuring process itself, the 
problem of a race to the sovereign debtor’s assets remains.235 By 
entrusting an individual or entity with exclusive power to file 
suit for default, the “super” trustee structure prevents vulture 
funds and rogue creditors from disrupting the restructuring 
process with threats of costly and cumbersome litigation.236 
Similarly, the pool of assets to be distributed among equally 
  
 225 Id. at 339-41. 
 226 Id.  
 227 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1104.  
 228 Id. at 1105. Although the Act provides that public, corporate bondholders 
have an absolute right to sue for past amounts due (as opposed to accelerated 
amounts), this provision could be removed from sovereign bond trustee indentures. See 
Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 724 n.23. 
 229 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1105. 
 230 Id. 
 231 See Galvis & Saad, supra note 19 , at 723. 
 232 See id. at 723-25. 
 233 See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1094. 
 234 See id.  
 235 See id.  
 236 See WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 1384, at 6-7. 
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situated bondholders is not raided, but distributed pro rata.237 
In addition, the case law and legal theories that have been 
applied to the trustee structure in the corporate context for 
almost three-fourths of a century could easily be transplanted 
to sovereign debt.238 Furthermore, fiduciary duties should curb 
fears that a trustee will not be aggressive in defending 
bondholders’ interests.239 Accordingly, the application of a 
“super” trustee structure should be the next step in solving the 
holdout crisis at the core of the sovereign debt dilemma.240 
CONCLUSION 
Although sovereign financing has undergone significant 
contractual reforms over the past decade,241 these efforts have 
generally failed to adequately address the inefficiencies created 
by holdout strategies. In the absence of a global sovereign debt 
restructuring regime, both creditors and debtors will need to 
continue to rely on contractual methods to effectuate sovereign 
debt restructuring.242 Notwithstanding the laudable 
improvements made by Mexico and Uruguay,243 additional 
refinements are necessary. In particular, the sovereign 
financing market should move towards the incorporation of a 
super trustee indenture. With a trustee to coerce creditor 
cooperation and ensure equitable treatment among 
bondholders, the super trustee fills in the gaps left by the early 
reforms. Therefore, the super trustee is necessary to curb the 
holdout problem and finally extinguish the sovereign debt 
dilemma. 
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 237 See id.  
 238 See Macmillan, supra note 33, at 65. 
 239 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1107. 
 240 See WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 1384, at 6-7. 
 241 See supra Part III. 
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